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I. Introduction
One of the enduring puzzles of political economy is to explain what determines the size of the public sector. As the economic role of government has expanded dramatically in recent decades in all continents of the world, huge differences have emerged between individual countries. One important aspect of governments' economic activities is their role as employer. In the early 1990s, according to one survey, civilian government employment ranged from just 1.8 percent of the labor force in Senegal to 34.7 percent in Sweden (SchiavoCampo 1997a). Large differences exist even within relatively homogeneous clusters of countries: Sweden's third of the work force in public sector jobs compares to about one twelfth of the workforce in Germany; within Africa, Senegal's 1.8 percent is dwarfed by Botswana's 16.6 percent.
Levels of public employment can also vary widely among regions or municipalities within the same country. In regions of Italy's South, for instance, public employees made up almost one quarter of the work force in 1995. In the country's North, the corresponding figure was only 12 percent (Alesina et al. 1999) . Among cities in the US, 8.7 percent of the population of Jackson, Tennessee, were government employees in 1991. The same year, only .05 percent were government employees in Highland, California (Alesina et al., 1998, p.10) .
What accounts for variation in public employment across and within nations? A variety of theories have been suggested. The oldest is Wagner's Law-the argument that economic development engenders demands for new types of government services, which require a larger public sector (Wagner 1883) . A second view is that public employment is a means by which politicians can conceal redistribution in favor of specific groups. Alesina et al. (1998) argue that for this reason public employment should be greater where income inequality or ethnic diversity is greater. Third, various scholars view government spending as a type of insurance against adverse economic conditions (Cameron 1978) , and public employment as one way to buffer the population against private sector unemployment (Rodrik 1997) . This argument was developed to explain large public sectors in countries dependent on volatile foreign trade, but its implications are more general. We propose a fourth hypothesis. The views of public employment as redistribution, insurance, or response to modernization all focus on the motives governments might have for hiring public employees. But a necessary condition for them to do so is that governments have the ability to pay them. Thus, the hardness of the budget constraint on governments-itself determined by their ability to collect taxes, attract transfers, or raise loans in capital markets-should also help to explain variation in levels of public employment. 1 In this paper, we examine which of these theories contribute to explaining the pattern of public employment change in Russia's 89 regions in the 1990s-and with what weights. Studying variation in public employment levels across the regions of a federal country has a number of analytical advantages. First, such a design holds constant (or almost constant) a vast number of potentially confounding factors-from legal system and monetary policy to macro-political culture. Second, the number of subregions or municipalities available for comparison is generally larger than can be mustered for a cross-national study. In focusing on subnational variation in public employment, we follow the recent example of Alesina et al. (1998 Alesina et al. ( , 1999 , and build on a growing literature on the determinants of public policy and public finance at the local level. 2 For several reasons, Russia offers a particularly promising setting to explore the determinants of public employment. It has a young and relatively fluid, democratizing political system, with electoral checks at local, regional and central levels. Thus, the impact of electoral calculation on policy should be particularly visible.
Regions vary quite dramatically in their degree of modernization, facilitating testing of the Wagner hypothesis. 3 The degree of economic crisis experienced in the 1990s also differed across regions in ways that make possible a test of the hypothesis that public employment acts as social insurance. 4 Finally, because of the poorly institutionalized system of fiscal federalism, Russia's regional governments face budget constraints of different degrees of hardness. Budget deficits were financed mostly by central fiscal transfers in the 1990s, and the level of these varied considerably across regions.
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Russia also exhibits considerable interregional variation in the level of public employment. As of 1998, the level of public employment in Russia's regions ranged from 19.5 percent in Tyumen Oblast to 54 percent in Ingushetia. 6 Most of the country's public sector job creation in the 1990s appears to have occurred in establishments that are subordinated to regional administrations and funded from regional budgets. Thus, the public employment figures can reasonably be thought to reflect particular regional policies and constraints.
Russia's experience in the 1990s offers additional puzzles for the political economist. The decade saw a massive, rapid process of privatization, reflecting in part deliberate policy and in part a severe collapse in state revenues. Employment in state owned enterprises fell from more than four fifths of total employment in 1990 to little more than one third in 1998. At the same time, total employment dropped by 12 percent and employment in the category "large and medium-sized enterprises and organizations," which includes all public employment, fell by 27.5 percent. However, contrary to all expectations, employment in public administration and in the almost entirely public education and health care sectors grew. That in education, culture and art grew only in relative terms-from 9.6 percent of the total in 1990 to 11.2 percent in 1998. But the actual number of employees went up in healthcare, sport and social protection (an additional 215 thousand workers) and in public administration (an additional 1.2 million)! Observers had expected that: "wages-and consequently employment-in health and education would fall relative to wages in the rest of economy as the market sector expanded." 7 Some decline was seen as appropriate because employment in these sectors started out from a comparatively high base-teacher-student ratios and other indicators of public service provision were often higher than in industrial countries. 8 In most other CEE transition countries health and education have downsized, while only employment in public administration has grown. The change in Russia's health and education sectors-expanding relative staffing levels alongside falling wages-stands out as a puzzle to be explained.
Second, while employment in government administration at the federal level has fallen in Russia since the beginning of transition, the corresponding statistic at the regional level has risen. 9 A similar trend has been 6 This represents the share of education, culture, art, and science; health care and sport; social protection; and public administration in total employment. For discussion of alternative definitions of public employment, see below.
7 Cheasty and Davis (1996) .
8 Ibid.
9 Data on employment in central branches of federal government executive bodies are available only from 1994. These show a fall in central federal government employees from 33.9 thousand in September 1994 to 28.9 thousand in December 1998 (Rossiisky Statistichesky Yezhegodnik 1999) . Before this, data are only available for public administration within the city of Moscow (i.e. including both federal government and Moscow city government). This category of workers fell in absolute terms from 183 thousand workers in 1992 to 135 thousand in 1994. It is extremely likely that this contains a drop in federal employees. Employment in public administration in regions other than Moscow grew by about 1.25 million workers between 1992 and 1998. noted in other parts of the world. Schiavo-Campo and colleagues find that in the 1980s and early 1990s local and regional employment in government administration rose in Asia, Latin America, and the OECD, while central government employment fell. Understanding the reasons for such a shift is crucial in order to assess its implications for the quality of public good provision and the desirability of decentralization reforms. It might represent an efficiency-enhancing decentralization of the provision of public services (au Oates 1972), making possible a closer match between community demands and the mix of public goods provided. Perhaps part of the increase represents the creation of infrastructure necessary for a law-governed market economy-unemployment assistance offices, antimonopoly structures, agencies dealing with bankruptcy, and so forth. Or it might represent the exploitation by local and regional politicians of rent-seeking opportunities opened up by central government attempts at liberalization. As financial resources are shifted down the state pyramid, are they used more efficiently to provide public goods? 10 Or are they invested at higher rates into patronage and bribes? Russia presents a revealing case study of such decentralization.
In the next section, we discuss hypotheses derived from the literature on public sector growth. Then, in
Section III, we describe the data and definitions of key variables. Section IV shows the general pattern of public employment in Russia's regions. Section V presents a multivariate analaysis of this pattern. Finally, Section VI concludes with a discussion of the results.
II. Hypotheses: What Explains Regional Levels of Public Employment?
We have six basic hypotheses. Though we discuss them separately, we do not consider them to be in contradiction and some are in fact highly complementary. The empirical analysis attempts, therefore, to estimate the weight of each in determining public employment levels in the Russian regions. Since the period we consider is one of transition from policy-making under communist rule to that under a market economy with elected governments, we expect many of the factors to become more important over time.
Economic Development
For decades, economists believed that the public sector grows according to Wagner's "law of increasing expansion of public, and particularly state, activities" (Wagner 1883, p.8) . Over time, public spending as a proportion of national income tended to grow, Wagner observed, "in progressive countries, at least in our Western European civilization". Interestingly for present purposes, he suggested that the association of economic 10 The economics literature, from Tiebout (1956) on, provides various reasons to expect that this would be the case. In a recent paper, Qian and Roland (1998) model how Tieboutian competition between subnational development and state expansion should hold even more strongly "when administration is decentralized and local government well organized," and noted a "marked increase in Germany in the fiscal requirements of municipalities, especially urban ones" (Ibid).
Wagner was somewhat vague about the cause of state expansion in more developed economies, attributing it to "the pressure for social progress", which required a deeper state involvement in the economy.
Others have added flesh to the idea. Musgrave suggested that in affluent societies, a growing share of private consumption expenditures "flows into 'adult toys' for leisure time use… pleasure cars, motorboats and other durables" the operation of which requires public investment and services-the building of "high-speed roads, marinas, parks, and so forth" or the organization of "traffic patrols, park services, or weather reporting" (Musgrave 1969, p.79) . The result should be an increase in the population's willingness to pay for public investments and employment-increasing services. As population density rises with urbanization, the risks of crime or accident may also rise at a disproportionate rate, requiring greater proportional public spending on policemen, firemen, and health inspectors to achieve the same level of public safety.
The cross-national evidence on Wagner's Law is generally clear and supportive. The association between economic development and larger government is obvious from merely glancing through the statistics on countries' spending levels. An examination of long periods of history in almost any country suggests that GDP and the size of government have grown in tandem (though not always at the same rates). There also seems to be a clear positive relationship between national income and public employment. Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997a, p.viii) find a close and significant positive relationship between relative government employment and national income (see also Heller and Tait 1984) . They do not observe a clear association between income and public employment among the OECD countries taken separately (in this small-n estimation of data for the early 1990s), but using a different dataset on public employment in 1963-83, Cusack, Notermans and Rein (1989) do. Kraay and Van Rijckeghem (1995) find that government employment increases with urbanization and education levels.
Do the same arguments that predict a link between higher income or development and higher public employment also make sense at subnational levels? As already noted, Wagner clearly thought they should.
German urban municipalities were in his time showing expanded "fiscal requirements," which he attributed to a growing demand for public goods and services associated with social progress. The public services needed to deal with problems of urban congestion or to facilitate the enjoyment of Musgrave's 'adult toys'-e.g.
lifeguards, traffic police, highways-can mostly be provided at least as efficiently at the local or state as at the central level. Alesina et al. (1998) Unfortunately, we did not believe that the Russian data available on income inequality within regions were adequate to test this part of the hypothesis, so we limited ourselves to testing whether ethnic republics within Russia had different trajectories of public employment. Focusing on the ethnic status of regions is an extremely preliminary way of getting at the ethnic redistribution hypothesis, and-as we discuss in the analysis-there are other possible interpretations of results involving the ethnic region variable. In particular, regions in our sample which had an ethnic identity also had a distinct administrative status-that of republics or autonomous districts. Higher administrative status is likely to be used to justify and to help to finance larger bureaucracies. So, as we will discuss below, disentangling specifically ethnic effects from those associated with institutional status is difficult.
11 There are two theoretical questions that remain open, however. First, Alesina et al. do not model why an incumbent politician would want to provide benefits to a minority against the wishes of the majority, whose votes are needed to stay in office. The propensity to favor the minority is introduced as an exogenous parameter. This can, of course, be motivated as the result of ethnic socialization, feelings of altruism, or conceptions of fairness. Second, it is not obvious why, given such a propensity, the extent of hidden redistribution would correlate with the size of the minority group. The implicit assumption seems to be that policymakers want to provide public jobs to some fixed proportion of members of the favored minority group. Why they would do this rather than maximizing the number of public jobs provided to the group subject to some constraint is not clear.
Public Employment and Electoral Competition
Incumbent politicians may not just use public employment to disguise transfers to minorities that their supporters would not approve; they may also use it to coopt the voters needed to form supportive majorities. A copious literature explores ways in which incumbent politicians manipulate public policies to buy votes, 7 that left almost all 89 regions with popularly elected executives. Theories of the "opportunistic" political business cycle posit that incumbent politicians expand public spending in the run-up to elections in order to buy the good will of voters (Nordhaus 1975) . One way in which they can attract voters is by creating additional public jobs. Since most of the benefit of these jobs to the new employee will come in the form of wages paid after the election, this creates an incentive to vote the "right" way.
This reasoning suggests one way in which public employment levels might be expected to vary with the electoral cycle. One might expect public employment to increase in the year before an election, and to decrease in the year after as the political urgency declines and the need for fiscal stringency increases-or as a new incumbent sweeps the deck of his rival's political appointees. The federal division of responsibility for public employment in Russia implies that one might expect to see such effects associated with both central and regional executive elections. For such pre-election increases to be feasible, incumbents must know in advance that an election is coming.
H3: a) public employment nationwide will grow faster than the trend in the year before an (expected) central presidential election (and perhaps also in the election year itself), and slower than the trend in the year after; b) public employment in a given region will grow faster than the trend in the year before an (expected)
gubernatorial election in that region (and perhaps also in the election year itself), and slower than the trend in the year after.
Political Ideology of Leaders
In the press, differences in the scale of public employment are most often attributed to ideological differences between the policy-makers responsible. Sweden's public sector is seen as having grown in the 1970s because of the social democratic views of those in government. The general fall in government employment in the OECD in the 1980s is attributed to the Reagan-Thatcher revolution. Various scholars have also traced distinctive economic policies to particular party governments (Hibbs 1977 , Cameron 1978 . Among Russia's regions in the 1990s, governors differed markedly in both ideological convictions and party affiliations. At one end of the spectrum was the staunchly left-wing Yuri Goryachev of Ulyanovsk Oblast, who attempted to keep inflation down and real incomes high by imposing price limits far longer than in most other regions. At the other were such market reformers as Boris Nemtsov of Nizhny Novgorod or Konstantin Titov of Samara. The degree to which regional governments liberalized by cutting their workforces might reflect such differences of governor ideology.
H4: public employment will be higher in regions where the governor is affiliated with the communists.
Public Employment as Economic Insurance
Another function of public employment may be to cushion the impact of macroeconomic crises caused by terms-of-trade shocks or other adverse events. 13 Rather than redistribution, the motive behind "excess" public employment is social insurance. "By providing a large number of 'secure' jobs in the public sector, a government can counteract the income and consumption risk faced by the households in the economy" (Rodrik 1997, p. 3) .
A couple of questions are left unresolved. First, it is not immediately clear why insurance could not be provided privately to reduce such risk or (more efficiently) by government on a fee-for-service basis. Rodrik refers to "undiversifiable external risk faced by the domestic economy," but does not say why such risk is undiversifiable. In the context of Russia's transition, though, it is easy to see why such insurance demand might not be met by nascent markets. Second, it does not seem likely a priori that those hired to fill government jobs would generally be those left unemployed by terms-of-trade shocks-the out-of-work textile worker does not usually turn up the next month as civil servant or teacher. Rodrik suggests that benefits may be passed on to the needy via the networks of extended families, but this is also somewhat tenuous. Either the redistribution or the demand for public goods arguments may still be needed to explain who gets hired.
Bearing in mind that the insurance argument may actually be complementary to the previous hypotheses, and that some questions would need to be answered to make it fully plausible, we nevertheless seek to test the hypothesis that the government is the "employer of last resort," using public employment to cushion against external shocks.
H5: public employment will be higher (or faster growing) where unemployment is greater, or rises particularly fast.
Public Employment and Soft Budget Constraints
Whatever the motives of policymakers, their ability to maintain large public sectors will depend on their financial resources. When regional governments receive larger transfers from federal government, this increases their capacity to fund public employees. Freinkman and Haney (1997) show that subsidies to inefficient enterprises increased in Russia's regions as transfers from the central budget increased. It is possible that another part of such transfers went into hiring (or deferring layoffs) of public employees. Variation across regions in the level of public employment may reflect differences in access to such transfers rather than (or as well as) differences in the degree of demand for public services, redistribution, or social insurance.
H6: public employment will be higher (or faster growing) in regions that received larger (or increasing)
transfers from the central budget.
III. Definitions and Data
There is no universal and generally accepted definition of what is called public employment.
14 The 1997
World Bank study defines public employment as that in central and non-central administration, public health and education. 15 In a similar vein, we use a measure (PE t ) that represents the share of total employment in education, health care and sport, social protection, culture, art and science, and public administration. Some adopt a broader definition, including all employees of state or municipally owned enterprises. In future work, as data permit, we will test the results obtained using PE t against results when more inclusive dependent variables are used.
The measure PE t has weaknesses that need to be acknowledged. It does not separate regional government establishments from those under federal subordination, and so also includes enterprises and 14 See, e.g., Rose (1985) and Schiavo-Campo (1997b) .
15 Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b) , p.47.
organizations that are located in the relevant region but funded from Moscow. The federal/regional division of fiscal responsibilities varies between subdivisions of the public sector and has changed over time. Regional budgets went from financing 66 percent of consolidated budget education spending in 1992 to 86 percent in 1996. The regional share of spending on social protection grew in the same period from 28 to 69 percent; that on health and sport from 89 to 90 percent; and that on state administration from 60 to 69 percent. 16 The changing framework of fiscal federalism needs to be borne in mind in interpreting the results. Another possible problem is that PE t embraces sectors that are predominantly public but may, however, include some private entities (in education, health care, culture or research). The private sector share in these sectors is small, and most of the institutions in them are managed and funded by regional authorities. The largest cities, Moscow and St.
Petersburg (both of which we refer to as capitals), are clear exceptions-most of the country's privately run health care and education are concentrated in them. These cities also contain most of the federal public employment financed directly from the federal budget (for instance, that in federal ministries, major universities, theaters, libraries, hospitals, and research centers.) We therefore try controlling for the capital cities in our multivariate regressions. PE t is available for 1992 to 1998.
To capture the six key hypotheses and control for possible confounding factors, we used data from a number of sources. For unemployment, we use the regional rates reported by Goskomstat RF using the OECD/ILO definition. Per capita gross regional product, the urban share of the population, the shares of the population under 16 and over 55 also came from Goskomstat publications. To focus on the initial level of economic development and reduce problems of endogeneity, we used gross regional product for the first year available, 1994. Data on transfers and loans to the regions are from Ministry of Finance reports on budget execution, for 1992-96 presented in Freinkman et al. (1999) , and for 1997 obtained directly from the Ministry of Finance. The transfers-plus-loans variables measure federal transfers and loans to the region per capita in thousand December 1991 rubles, deflated with the regional CPI's calculated by Goskomstat. The data on gubernatorial elections in the regions and on the political affiliations of the governors were gathered from a number of sources, including McFaul and Petrov (1998), McFaul, Petrov, and Ryabov (1999) , and the Institute for East-West Studies Handbook of Regional Executives. In testing for pre-election increases in public employment, we excluded those elections which could not have been predicted by the incumbent the year before (for instance, those that were called just a few months before the election). 16 Figures for education, social protection, and health and sport are from Freinkman et al. (1999, Table A10 ). The 1992 figure for administration is calculated from figures in Sinelnikov (1995, 
IV. General Trends in Public Employment
In Russia in the 1990s, a combination of economic reforms, drastic GDP contraction, and growth in the underground economy led to a sharp fall in total registered employment. Whereas in 1992, more than 72 million Russians were officially employed, by 1998 the total had dropped to less than 64 million (see Table 1 ). This represented a decline from 95 percent of the labor force ("economically active population") to 88 percent. The state sector was no exception to this trend. As privatization and new private business development began to reshape the post-communist economy, employment in state-owned enterprises and organizations fell even faster.
State sector employees declined from about 83 percent of the total in 1990 to 38 percent in 1998.
[ Table 1 About Here]
However, if we look more specifically at sectors made up of public service providers funded directly from the budget-health care and sport, social protection, education, culture and art, science, and public administration, i.e., the subsectors we include in PE t -the share of such public service providers has grown in the aggregate (Table 2) . Employment in public administration grew from 2.1 percent of the total in 1990 to 4.4 percent in 1998; that in healthcare, sport, and social security grew from 5.6 to 7.0 percent; and that in education, culture and art from 9.6 to 11.2 percent. The workforce in science fell sharply, but not by enough to offset the large gains in other categories: overall employment in these overwhelmingly public sectors rose from 21.0 to 24.6 percent of the total. Employment in health care, sport and social protection and in public administration did not only increase in relative terms as total employment dropped-the actual number of employees in these sectors increased. In absolute terms, the workforce in public administration grew by 1.2 million, and that in health, sport and social security by 215 thousand.
[ Table 2 About Here]
Public employment levels vary significantly across regions. The share of education, culture, art, science, health care, sport, social protection and administration, (PE t ), ranged from 19.5 percent of total employment in 1998 in Tyumen Oblast to 54 percent in the republic of Ingushetia. Regions differed not just at a particular point in time but also in the rate and direction of change. [ Table 3 and Chart 1 About Here]
How do the high public employment regions differ from the low public employment ones? To get a preliminary sense of this, we examined the ten regions with the highest public employment as of 1998 and compared them to the 10 regions with the lowest public employment. Most of the regions with the largest share are ethnically-defined units with autonomous status. They are mostly poor and heavily subsidized but enjoy relatively more administrative power than regions lacking autonomous status. Chita, Pskov, and Novgorod
Oblasts round out the list. The lowest rates of public employment occur mostly among heavily industrialized regions, along with the capital cities of Moscow and St Petersburg. To test for the relative contribution of our six hypotheses, we now proceed to multivariate analysis.
V. Multivariate Analysis
To disentangle the effects of different possible causes, we regressed our indicator of public employment, PE t , on explanatory variables related to our hypotheses. We used a cross-section, time series design to exploit both the cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in the data. We calculate coefficients by OLS, but report "panel-corrected standard errors", as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995) , which are corrected for panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. 17 To reduce problems of autocorrelation, we included a lagged term of the dependent variable, as recommended by Beck and Katz (1996) , who argue that this is preferable to using generalized least squares or other available techniques. The results should therefore be interpreted as explaining change in public employment shares rather than their absolute level. We also included dummies for year in the regressions, to separate general trends from patterns associated with particular regions. Table 4 shows the results of these regressions. We first look for a simple correlation between the given independent variable and public employment, controlling only for year and previous year public employment.
Then, in the model shown in column 9, we include the full range of relevant explanatory variables, along with 17 Panel-corrected standard errors are more accurate than standard errors computed by the Parks FGLS method for data of the kind analyzed in this paper (see Beck and Katz 1995) . In STATA, we used the option pcse.
controls for the age structure of the population (which may capture differences in regions' demand for public services such as health care or education), and for Moscow and St Petersburg (in which the relevant sectors include some significant federal public component and private element). 18 Relatively quickly-changing variables such as unemployment or central transfers are included in the form of the previous year's level and the one-year change to make it possible to capture effects of both recent changes and longer run trends. In Table 5 , we show the full model when run for different sectors separately.
[ Tables 4 and 5 should boost the demand for education, and ethnic status was significantly associated with higher employment in this sector but not with higher employment in administration or health. 19 But although most of the "ethnic" effect looks more like meeting demand than political redistribution, a significant residual effect does remain even once all controls are included, suggesting that ethnic units have on average almost one third of a percentage point higher public employment that is not explained by the population's age structure.
Does this reflect pressures for ethnic redistribution? Obviously, more direct information would be needed to establish this-for instance, data on the ethnic composition of public employment in the regions, data that unfortunately were not available. And there are other possible explanations. As noted already, the ethnic regions have a different administrative status and political relationship with the center which affords them greater rights and privileges than their non-ethnic counterparts. Here we can only present some additional indirect evidence. If public employment in ethnic regions was higher because of redistribution to non-Russian ethnic groups, the pressures for this might be greater if the non-Russian population in the region was larger. 20 We tried including a term for the proportion of the population in the ethnic regions that was non-Russian (as of the 1989 census) in the full model regression. In fact, the proportion non-Russian was negatively (but not significantly) related to the change in public employment. This might cast some doubt on the interpretation of the finding as evidence for ethnically motivated redistribution. However, another piece of evidence is slightly more supportive. Controlling for the status of the ethnic unit, if the unit had a governor (for at least part of the year) who was of non-Russian nationality, the increase in public employment tended to be almost one third of a percentage point higher (though this was only significant at about p < .20, and so should not be viewed as at all reliable). Our preference is to remain agnostic about whether the faster growth of public employment in Russia's ethnic units is the result of redistribution to non-Russian groups or is better explained as a result of the distinct administrative status of ethnic regions.
The evidence on electoral effects is mixed. At the national level, Russia held a presidential election in 1996. The trend of public employment growth shown in Table 2 Table 4 suggests that this pattern held not only in the aggregate but on average across regions. The estimated effects (from model 9) were for a 1.17 point increase in public employment in 1995, a 1.64 point increase in 1996, and a .35 point drop (not significant) in 1997. The evidence is hardly conclusive-many other factors might explain why such a trend appeared in these years. Note,
however, that such a pattern is not explained away by the other factors hypothesized to affect public employment and included in the regressions. Table 5 shows that this trend is entirely caused by changes in the level of employment in public administration-both health and education employment do not have this trend in the estimated year effects. Recall that public administration was the category of public employment that actually rose not just as a share of total employment but as the number of jobs positively increased.
Evidence of cycles in public employment around elections for regional governors are far less clear. The pattern appears to fit the hypothesis when no controls are included-there is then a significant increase in public employment during the year in which the region held a gubernatorial election (Table 4 , columns 4 and 5).
However, this effect disappears completely in the aggregate regressions once controls are included (column 9). A significant effect remains, however, in the regression for public administration employment (Table 5 , column 3), which increases significantly in the year before a gubernatorial election and falls significantly in the year after.
Are new, non-incumbent governors more likely to sweep out the Augean stables after election, firing the political appointees of their predecessors? The signs of the coefficients on the variable for a non-incumbent elected the previous year fit this conjecture, but the estimates are not significant except in the regression for education, culture, art and science employment in Table 5 . (And, for public administration employment, there is no greater propensity for a new governor to reduce employment after the election.)
To sum up, there is some quite persuasive evidence of political business cycle manipulations in the levels of employment in public administration, but not in those of education or healthcare. 21 Public administration employment in the average region rose before the 1996 nationwide presidential election and fell afterward (in ways that cannot be explained for instance by changes in unemployment levels). Public administration employment also rose significantly faster in the year before an expected gubernatorial election and fell significantly faster in the year after the election. There is some relatively weak evidence that newly elected governors reduce public employment-at least in education, culture, art and science-faster than if the incumbent is reelected.
One interesting negative result emerges from the analysis: the political ideology or affiliations of the governor do not appear to influence his public employment strategy. Governors affiliated with the communists were no faster or slower than others to increase the level of public employment, either in the aggregate or taking different types of public employment separately.
The economic insurance hypothesis was quite strongly supported. In regions with higher unemployment rates and especially in those that had suffered a particularly sharp increase in unemployment that year, public employment increased significantly. A one percentage point jump in unemployment in a given year was associated with a .09 percentage point increase in public employment, other things equal. 22 Most of the increase came in education, culture, art, science, healthcare, sport and social protection, but a small part may also have come in public administration (see Table 5 ). Thus, the evidence does support the conjecture that regional governments in Russia act as "employers of last resort", trying to cushion the blow of sharp increases in local unemployment. Their ability to do so is obviously limited, as suggested by the low estimated coefficient.
Finally, the government budget constraint hypothesis was strongly supported by the evidence. Regions receiving higher or more rapidly increasing financial aid from the federal government had faster growing public sectors. The estimates in Table 4 rubles per capita), the regression predicts that its public employment level would have been about .8 of a percentage point higher. Table 5 suggests that increases in transfers and loans translated within a year into higher employment levels in education, culture, art or science, but that higher federal aid led with a longer lag to higher staffing levels in healthcare, sport, social protection, and public administration as well.
Are regional governments more likely to spend money received in transfers and loans from the federal government on increasing public employment than they are to spend other kinds of locally raised revenues on this? The data suggest that the answer is yes. When terms for the region's real revenues from other sources and change in the region's real revenues from other sources are included in the regressions-either with or without controls and other variables-the estimated positive effects of transfers and loans remain highly significant with similar coefficients, but the coefficients on both previous year other revenue and change in other revenue are negative (not significant if controls are included). That is, other things equal, regional governments with higher or faster increasing other revenues do not have faster growing public employment. It is only federal transfers that appear to stimulate this public sector expansion.
To recap, contrary to Wagner, it was less developed regions that had the greatest increases in public employment after transition to the market in Russia. Ethnically defined units of the state also had larger increases, especially in education, culture, art and science, which might suggest ethnically motivated redistribution, but might equally well reflect different demand for and supply of public employment in regions with different administrative status. The political ideology or affiliation of regional governors does not seem to affect their public employment strategies. There was some evidence of opportunistic increases in public administration employment before elections (and reductions afterward). Public employment correlated positively included.
with the trend and recent changes in unemployment, and was strongly related to the level and recent change in federal transfers and loans-though not to the level or change in locally raised revenues.
VI. Discussion
Public employment in Russia's regions increased more when federal transfers and loans increased. But what caused what? It might be that increased transfers make possible increased public sector hiring (or slower firing), the interpretation we have assumed. But higher levels of public employment might themselves call forth larger federal transfers.
We lacked a sufficiently long time sequence of data to run reliable Granger tests of causality. However, we did run panel regressions trying alternately to predict PE with lagged transfers and loans and transfers and loans with lagged PE. 23 Lagged transfers and loans turn out to be extremely significant (at p < .001) predictors of PE, controlling for lagged PE and year dummies. When the full period 1992-98 is included, lagged PE is not at all significant in predicting transfers and loans. However, lagged PE became a better predictor of transfers and loans as the decade progressed. It is only in 1992-94 that PE is insignificant; if a similar regression is run using just the data from 1995 on, lagged PE is even more significant at predicting transfers and loans than vice versa.
Our interpretation is that: (a) transfers and loans help to predict public employment in the whole period 1992-98, and (b) higher public employment helps to predict faster rising transfers and loans in the period from 1995 on.
In fact, observation of political events and discourse suggests the possibility of a perverse interaction between public employment and federal transfers in the late 1990s. Governors may have consciously chosen to boost (or slow decline in) local education, health, and administrative payrolls in the hope of attracting greater federal financial aid. By hiring more doctors, teachers, and the like-or not laying off those for which long-term financing was unavailable-regional politicians used the federal transfers received in a given year to create hostages who could help to pressure the federal government for transfers in the future. Higher transfers made this hiring possible, but probably left a good deal of the total for governors to divert to other uses.
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While we cannot prove all aspects of this story, a variety of evidence supports it. First, the surprising growth in the public employment share in the 1990s was clearly masterminded by regional governors more than by central officials. Education and health had been almost entirely devolved to regional and local governments, 23 The regressions were of the form: (1) pe t = a + b 1 pe t -1 + b 2 trans t -1 + b 3 d, and (2) trans t = a + b 1 pe t -1 + b 2 trans t -1 + b 3 d, where trans ≡ federal transfers and loans; d is a vector of year dummies; and b 3 is a vector of coefficients on the year dummies. 24 Freinkman and Haney (1997) find that higher federal transfers correlated during this period with higher spending on housing and heating subsidies-a form of spending that is particularly regressive, since the larger houses and apartments of the rich use more subsidized heat. so hiring decisions in these fields were made at these levels. The number of executive branch workers in Russia 
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Both of these rates were faster than the average for the economy. Regions with higher wage arrears tended to have higher votes for the political opposition in the 1993 parliamentary election and lower votes for Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election (Treisman 1999, chapter 4) . Also, regions with higher public sector wage arrears may have been more prone to disruptive strikes. In fact, as Table 6 shows, by 1997 strikes in Russia occurred almost entirely in the education sector. 28 In 1998, 95 percent of the organizations where strikes occurred were in education; and the education sector lost 66 percent of the total time lost to strikes (see Table 6 ). The extent of wage arrears in education in a given region as of the end of 1997 (as a percentage of the monthly wage bill) correlated at .39 with the number of man-days lost to strikes per thousand employees in the region that year.
25 Trud I Zanyatost v Rossii 1999, p.96. 26 Ibid, p.98.
27 Ibid, p.345. 28 The healthcare sector also has a very high propensity for collective protest, which was partly neutralized by strong moral pressures on medical personnel not to strike and public outrage when fatalities could be linked to strikes. Nevertheless, cases of collective actions such as strikes or hunger strikes of unpaid doctors abound.
(Controlling for strike losses the previous year, per capita regional product, unemployment, or various other factor renders the relationship even stronger.) Public sector wage arrears also eroded trust in the state, and may have made it easier for private employers to continue delaying wages. Earle and Sabirianova (1999) argue that the institutionalization of wage arrears facilitated their spread across the economy. So there would seem to be good reason for federal policymakers to fear the accumulation of regional public sector wage arrears.
[ Table 6 About Here]
And there are numerous examples of cases where the federal goverment provided emergency financial aid to pay such wages. Extracting such aid-with the help of striking workers-was a well-established game.
For instance, in February 2000, just before the scheduled presidential election, the governor of Omsk, Leonid
Polezhaev, traveled to Moscow to negotiate for aid to pay striking teachers, whose action had left 40,000 school children in the region without classes. He reportedly met with the finance minister and acting president Vladimir
Putin. On arriving back in Omsk, Polezhaev's deputy "assured the strikers that the money necessary for paying out the teachers' salaries should arrive in the oblast in the next 10 days."
29
Financial aid, when it does come, does not always go to pay the wage arrears at which it was targeted.
Governors may actually have an interest in keeping some arrears. As the head of the government's social policy department, Yevgeny Gontmakher, told one newspaper: "For some governors, it is to their benefit to maintain wage arrears, in order to ask for more funds from Moscow. Aman Tuleev is an example." 30 In December 1998, the federal Finance Ministry published a list of regions it accused of "misusing federal monies allocated for wages". 31 Regions that received larger transfers and loans in 1996 or 1997 did not have lower arrears in education and healthcare in 1997. In fact, the correlation was positive. (And the same was true controlling for other revenues of the regional governments that year.)
While time series for arrears and a number of other variables would be required to test this story more rigorously, there does thus seem to be some evidence that regional governments: 1) deliberately inflate public employment, 2) use the potential militancy of health and education workers to lobby for larger federal tranfers and loans, 3) deliberately create wage arrears in these sectors to invigorate such militancy, and 4) when they get larger transfers, invest part of the proceeds in inflating public employment still further. 
VII. Conclusion
Public employment in Russia has grown quite dramatically in the 1990s, despite the economic crisis that afflicted the country, the sharp drop in tax revenues collected, and the expectation that liberalization and privatization would lead to a smaller state. Most of this increase appears to have occurred at the regional level.
The increase has been greatest where unemployment was highest and growing the fastest, in ethnically defined territorial units, and in regions which received larger federal transfers and loans. Public employment did not grow faster where regions themselves collected higher revenues. Employment in public administration grew faster during the buildup to a gubernatorial election, and slowed down afterward. It also grew much faster during the buildup to the 1996 presidential election, and slowed down afterward. Thus, regional governors appear to use public employment for several purposes: as a kind of economic insurance to cushion the population against Tables and Charts: Source: Goskomstat Rossii; "public employment" = health, sport and social protection + education, culture, art and science + public administration. The line represents no change in pe between 1992 and 1998; all regions located above the line have increases in pe. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Note: 1998 data were unavailable for transfers and loans or for unemployment. Data from 1993-98. 1 healthcare, sport and social protection; education, culture, art and science; and public administration. 
